Third Circuit Opinion: United States v. Chapman
Arseneault & Fassett, LLC
In United States v. Chapman, No. 16-1810 (3d Cir. Aug. 4, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that mailing threatening communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §876(c), qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of determining career offender status under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Violations of §876(c) are punishable by up to five years imprisonment generally, or up to ten years if directed against a federal judge or federal law enforcement official. Chapman had been convicted of two prior violations of §876(c), first after he mailed a letter threatening to kill President George W. Bush, and then after mailing a letter which threatened a federal judge and court staff. After violating the terms of his supervised release following his second conviction, Chapman sent another threatening letter to the federal prosecutor who was handling Chapman’s revocation. After pleading guilty, Chapman was deemed a career offender based on his three convictions under §876(c).
Chapman argued that mailing threatening communications was not a crime of violence because it did not require “violent physical force.” The Court applied a categorical approach to the question, comparing only the elements of the statute against the guideline and disregarding the particular facts of Chapman’s offenses. By this method, if the statute has the same element as the guideline, or defines the offense more narrowly, then a violation counts toward career offender status. If the statute defines offense conduct more broadly, then career status is not implicated. The Sentencing Guidelines define the predicate “crime of violence” as including any offense punishable by more than one year imprisonment that has as an element the “threatened use of physical force against another.” The statute prohibits communications “containing  any threat to injure the person of the addresses or of another.” The Court noted the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “physical force” as “violent force” and reasoned that the common definition of “injure” implicates “physical force.” Therefore, the violations of §876(c) qualify toward career offender status. By its holding, the Court brought the Third Circuit into alignment with the First, Second, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits.